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Abstract 
In this study we examine the effectiveness of formal institutions (as the macro-level 
mechanism) and external auditing (as the micro-level mechanism) in controlling 
multinational firms’ engagement in bribery. We adopt World Bank’s data and investigate 
38,673 firms in 113 countries. Our results suggest that a firm’s engagement in bribery is 
positively related to its foreign ownership. Furthermore, we demonstrate the substitute effects 
of formal institutions and external auditing in controlling this unethical activity. We argue 
that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm’s internal governance 
mechanism plays a vital role in controlling bribery.  
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1. Introduction 
Corruption and bribery have drawn enormous attention in the international business field 
(Birhanu, Gambardella, & Valentini, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Cuervo-Cazurra & Genc, 
2008; Luo & Han, 2009; Puffer, Mccarthy, & Peng, 2013). The illegal nature of corruption 
and bribery imposes high costs on business and ultimately hurts firms’ performance. This has 
led to the emergence of a large set of studies analyzing the best ways for eliminating or at 
least controlling corruption (Ashforth, Gioia, Robinson, & Trevino, 2008; Beets, 2005; 
Gorsira, Denkers, & Huisman, 2016; Lange, 2008). 
In the corruption literature, there is an on-going debate about the antecedents of bribery 
and ways of controlling. Neo-institutional theory emphases on the importance of the 
institutions and proposes that managers are confronted with different environments where 
bribery and corruption are socially and culturally acceptable norms though they may have 
cognitive pressure to implement an ethical and legal behavior (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006). 
Enormous studies have shown that non-transparent institutions, under-developed market 
mechanisms, together with social and cultural norms are the roots of corruption (Luo, 2005a; 
Martin, Cullen, Johnson, & Parboteeah, 2007; Zheng, El Ghoul, Guedhami, & Kwok, 2013). 
This stream of study emphases on the role of formal institutions in the form of law in 
controlling bribery supply and demand across intuitional settings (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2006; 
2008). By contrast, agency theorists view corruption as the results of managerial conflict and 
stresses managers at headquarters in home country can hardly establish control to deter 
managers at the foreign subsidiaries from engaging in unethical activities because of 
information asymmetry. Under this view, managers at the foreign subsidiaries are 
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self-interest opportunists and tend to serve their personal objectives at the expense of the 
firm’s long-term performance (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). Based on this reasoning, the root of 
corruption has shifted from the normative and institutional pressures to goal conflicting 
organizational members and internal information asymmetry. Hence, appropriate governance 
mechanisms should be designed to discipline self-interested management from engaging in 
the unethical and illegal activity. 
Neo-institutional theory and agency theory offer macro and micro mechanisms in coping 
with corruption and bribery. However, limited studies have explicitly discussed the 
effectiveness of these two mechanisms and explored the possible interplay between them in 
controlling bribery in the international business field (Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016; Kwok & 
Tadesse, 2006; Spencer & Gomez, 2011). Agency theory explains the antecedents of bribery 
by addressing the potential conflicts between a firm’s headquarter and its foreign subsidiaries. 
But what left unexplained from an agency perspective is the question of “why are bribery 
being conducted at different levels across nations?” A large number of scandals regarding 
corporate bribery have revealed the fact that multinational corporations’ subsidiaries are more 
likely to bribe in emerging economies than in developed economies. Institutional perspective 
addresses the role of formal and informal institutional factors in shaping firms’ activities. 
Existing literature on corporate governance goes beyond the simple agency relationship and 
suggests the agency relationship and corporate governance mechanisms are shaped by 
external institutional factors across nations (Bruton, Filatotchev, Chahine, & Wright, 2010; 
Filatotchev, Jackson, & Nakajima, 2013; Kogut, Walker, & Anand, 2002). However, as Kim, 
Prescott and Kim (2005) argue, the external environment sets up universal and minimum 
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standards. It is down to the multinational firms to foster good micro-level governance 
mechanisms to minimise the agency costs and control agent’s unlawful behavior, such as 
bribery.  
Our paper endeavors to fill in these gaps and hence makes two contributions. First, in 
contrast to the rich and fruitful findings on the antecedents of bribery (Collins, Uhlenbruck, & 
Rodriguez, 2009; Martin et al., 2007) and the consequences of bribery (Lee & Weng, 2013; 
Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, & Eden, 2006; Zhou & Peng, 2012), few studies have adopted 
multiple-level analyses and offered a comprehensive understanding of bribery and corruption 
control. In this study, we argue that the firm-level bribery varies significantly with the 
institutional environment in the firm’s host country and the individual firm’s governance 
strength. We integrate agency theory with institutional perspective to explicitly explain the 
efficiency of bribery control under varied institutional environment settings. In specific, we 
highlighted the importance of the distinct contextual environment in which firms are 
embedded, and articulated the interplay of macro-institutions and micro-level governance 
mechanism in controlling bribery in international business.  
Second, our findings contribute to corruption literature by highlighting the substitute 
effects of the internal governance (as the micro-level mechanism) and the external institution 
(as the macro-level mechanism) on controlling bribery. Though existing corporate 
governance studies have discussed the substituting and complementing effects of micro- and 
macro-level corporate governance mechanisms (Abdi & Aulakh, 2012; Hüttenbrink, 
Oehmichen, Rapp, & Wolff, 2014; Misangyi & Acharya, 2014), we extend the argument and 
place the agency relationship under circumstances where a multinational firm’s headquarter 
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and its foreign subsidiaries have different attitudes and interests in supplying bribery. 
Researchers have studied bribery control in both firm and country levels; but overlooked the 
possible interplay between the firm and country level elements in reducing bribery (Doh, 
Rodriguez, Uhlenbruck, Collins, & Eden, 2003; Montiel, Husted, & Christmann, 2012). In 
this paper, we suggest that in a situation whereby formal institutions are weak, a firm’s 
internal governance mechanism plays a vital role in controlling the firm-level bribery.  
 
2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development  
Many researchers adopted a broad definition on corruption and considered corruption as 
the abuse (or misuse) of public power for private benefits (Bardhan, 1997). Corruption is 
however a complex and multifaceted phenomenon (Luo & Han, 2009) and has various forms 
under different contexts (Puffer et al., 2013). To examine the control of corruption, we first 
refine our research focus on corruption. Corruption occurs at the interface of the public and 
private sectors where a public agent has discretionary power over resource access and 
distribution to the private sector (Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). Therefore, illegal payment has to 
be paid to the public agent to obtain private benefits for an individual or a firm 
(Rose-Ackerman, 1999). The illegal payment or bribery is one specific form of corruption 
and is the focus of this study. In this paper, we study the control of corruption that aims to 
reduce the supply of bribes by managers. We adopt Luo and Han (2009)’s concept and define 
bribery as the extent to which the firm engages in various forms of payments to public 
officials to “get things done” with regard to government or public services, such as customs, 
taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc. 
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2.1 Foreign ownership and bribery intensity 
Based on agency theory, we argue that foreign ownership will lead to an increase of 
bribery in the host country. In this paper, we follow World Bank’s definition and measure 
foreign ownership by the percentage of the total share owned by foreign individuals, 
companies or organizations. The central premise of agency theory is the separation of 
ownership and control where the principal delegates the work to an agent who then performs 
the work (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). Specifically, agency theory asserts that the agent can 
engage in decision-making and behavior that may be inconsistent with principal’s interests 
(Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Agency theory is concerned with resolving two 
problems. The first is the agency problem that arises when the desires or goals of the 
principal and agent conflict. The problem here is that the principal and the agent may prefer 
different actions because of the different preferences. The second is the problem of 
monitoring that arises when the principal has difficulties to verify what the agent is doing. 
The problem here is that the principal cannot verify that the agent has behaved appropriately 
due to information asymmetry. 
Agency theory becomes applicable in bribery once a firm expands overseas. According 
to Roth and O’Donnell (1996), international investment has distinguished the universe 
managerial team into two groups, namely managers at headquarters in the home country and 
managers in the foreign subsidiary. Nohria and Ghoshal (1994) suggest that managers at 
headquarters, as the principal, cannot effectively make all the decisions; and hence delegate 
the work and responsibilities to foreign subsidiaries. This process creates an agency problem. 
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First, managers at headquarters and managers in the foreign subsidiaries may have different 
goals. Subsidiary management thus may make decisions that are not congruent with those 
desired by headquarters. Managers at headquarters seek to gain competitive advantages and 
maximize financial return while minimizing additional costs and risks associated overseas 
operation in an ethical and legal way (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). By contrast, managers in the 
foreign subsidiary act as self-interested agents whose interest is to improve the success of 
their business operations in the short term and thus enhance their career prospects 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). The principal-agent relationship between the headquarters and 
foreign subsidiary due to interest conflict has been well documented (Kim et al., 2005; 
Nohria & Ghoshal, 1994; Roth & O’Donnell, 1996). Second, it is hard for the headquarter to 
obtain detailed and accurate information about foreign subsidiaries’ activities and 
multinational firm’s global presence magnifies the information asymmetry problem 
(O’Donnell, 2000). Luo (2005b) for example suggests that a firm’s global expansion creates a 
list of far-flung enterprises and aggravates information asymmetries between the headquarter 
and foreign subsidiaries.  
It is well recognized that without proper governance, the agent will be more likely to 
deviate from the interests of the principal (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Following this logic, 
managers in the foreign subsidiary are more likely to serve their own interest due to 
information asymmetry and insufficient monitoring means following the geographical 
distance (Filatotchev & Wright, 2011). Because the actions and outputs of the foreign 
subsidiary become less verifiable and accountable, adverse selection and moral hazard may 
occur simultaneously (Kim et al., 2005). Following this line of research, we argue that 
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foreign ownership leads to an increase of bribery in the host country. In specific, managers in 
the foreign subsidiary are more likely to bribe government officials to smooth the market 
penetration and enhance performance in the short term. Competition from other multinational 
firms and local firms impel the foreign subsidiary to resort to bribery as a means of seeking 
competitive advantages (Robertson & Watson, 2004). Kwok and Tadesse (2006) also admit 
that offering bribery to a public agent might be more financially meaningful in the short term 
than endeavoring to shape the institutional environment. Hence, we hypothesize: 
Hypothesis 1. There is a positive relationship between a firm’s foreign ownership and 
bribery intensity. 
 
2.2 Institutions, foreign ownership, and bribery intensity 
Institutions, which are defined as “the rules of the game” (North, 1990; Scott, 1995), 
have been proved to exhibit formal and informal pressures for firms, and in turn affect a 
firm’s behavior. The neo-institutional theory focuses on the interactions between institutions 
and firms and states that a firm’s activities are the outcomes of such interactions (Peng & 
Heath, 1996; Peng, Wang, & Jiang, 2008). In other words, institutions determine how firms 
formulate and implement strategy because both formal and informal institutions have 
capacities to control and constrain managerial behavior. Formal institutions include politics, 
legal aspects, and market-supporting institutions while informal institutions refer to social 
norms and culture within a society (North, 1990; Peng, 2003). 
The impact of external institutional factors on corruption has been well researched and a 
number of country-level institutions have been identified to be associated with corruption 
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(Rose-Ackerman, 1999; Tonoyan, Strohmeyer, Habib, & Perlitz, 2010). This paper stresses 
the importance of formal institutions and argues that foreign subsidiaries’ attributes towards 
bribery depend on the peculiarities of formal institutions in host countries. Formal institutions 
in the host country facilitate information distribution and enhance foreign subsidiaries’ 
decision-making accountability. Corporate governance literature has suggested that 
information flow is a prerequisite of good corporate governance practice because information 
asymmetry leads to moral hazard and opportunism (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & 
Vishny, 2000; Shleifer & Vishny, 1997). Well-developed formal institutions, such as solid 
company law and corporate governance code, mandate firms to disclose information 
completely and accurately. An extensive literature has suggested that a firm’s disclosure 
strategy is subject to legal and proprietary constraints (Grossman, 1981; Grossman & Hart, 
1980; Healy & Palepu, 2001; Verrecchia, 2001). Corporate governance literature suggests a 
positive relationship between disclosure and control of agency problem. The underlying 
notion is that greater disclosure allows management to be closely monitored and in turn 
“forces” the management to scrupulously exercise their rights. For instance, Lang and 
Lundholm (1996) suggested a significant positive relationship between disclosure and 
following-up analyses of companies’ financial affairs. Thus, strong formal institutions (e.g. 
legal requirement) offer quality investor protection and effectively control of agent 
opportunism (e.g. bribery). For example, Cuervo-Cazurra (2016) asserts that formal 
institutions, such as counter-corruption laws, impartial and efficient legal reinforcement, 
determine the prevalence of bribery. He argues the fact that a large number of countries with 
very similar historical and cultural traditions have very different levels of corruption can be 
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attributed to formal institution diversity across countries. Rose-Ackerman (1999) has also 
attributed corruption to the weak counter-corruption institutions. 
The neo-institutional theory emphasizes how organizations adjust to pressures for 
“legitimacy” under specific institutional environments (Scott, 1995). Following this line of 
argument, foreign firms have to adjust their behaviour (e.g. disclosure strategy) to adopt “the 
rule of the game in a society” (North, 1990: p.3). Different nations have different formal 
institutions in corporate governance and disclosure regimes. In contexts characterized by 
strong formal institutions, investors’ interest can be better protected and agent’s opportunism 
can be effectively controlled because of the more transparent corporate disclosure system. In 
contrast, under weak formal institution context where legal framework is inadequate, it has 
been observed that firms engage in widespread opportunistic and unlawful behaviours (Li & 
Atuahene-Gima, 2001; Peng & Health, 1996). These arguments suggest that in setting with 
strong formal institutions, agency conflicts could be mitigated as the transparent disclose 
system helps the headquarter to deter foreign subsidiaries’ from engaging in bribery 
(Cuervo-Cazurra, 2016). On the other hand, a weak formal institutional environment could 
aggravate the agency conflicts due to the absence of the efficient corporate disclose 
requirement and other counter-corruption laws. Thus, we propose that: 
Hypothesis 2. Formal institutions negatively moderate the relationship between foreign 
ownership and bribery intensity. 
 
2.3 Auditing, foreign ownership, and bribery intensity 
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Auditing is an important internal controlling and self-regulatory elements of corporate 
governance. Auditing process normally involves a wide set of intermediaries, such as 
financial analysts, internal and external auditors (Palepu & Healy, 2003). A well-functioning 
system of auditing verifies the completeness and accuracy of financial transactions, and 
hence is important to discipline agent and minimize agency problem (Lambert, 2001). In 
order to verify management behavior in the host countries, the headquarter has to 
systematically review management perquisites, audit financial statements and reject 
inappropriate spending. Thus, financial auditing can effectively ratify management initiatives 
and evaluate managerial performance; consequently, award and penalize management by 
criteria that are set by the headquarter management. 
Agency theory suggests auditor effectiveness hinges on its ability to perform 
independently as a gatekeeper. Researchers have offered enormous evidence about the 
beneficial role of external independent actors on governance. For example, Montiel et al. 
(2012) suggest that passing a third-party auditing performed by an independent firm verifies 
the firm’s adherence to the requirements specified by the standard under a corrupted 
environment. Although some observers criticize auditing increases the firm’s dependency on 
its large clients (Palepu & Healy, 2003), a large number of studies have suggested that 
auditors are unlikely to risk their reputation on a single client’s indiscretions (Coffee Jr., 2004; 
DeFond, Raghunandan, & Subramanyam, 2002). 
Prior research reveals that agency cost is more intense without effective internal 
corporate governance mechanisms (Coles, McWilliams, & Sen, 2001; Hu, Tam, & Tan, 
2010) and auditing as an internal mechanism plays an instrumental role in disciplining 
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agent’s behavior (Brennman & Solomon, 2010; DeFond & Zhang, 2014). In specific, we 
argue that the auditing as a micro-level disciplining mechanism provides an effective 
oversight of the foreign subsidiaries’ managers and mitigates self-serving behavior. Firms 
adopting reputable and independent auditor tend to be characterized by transparent financial 
reporting and voluntary disclosures (Brennman & Solomon, 2010). Under such environment, 
foreign subsidiaries’ self-serving behavior can be mitigated because headquarters have 
sufficient and accurate information to ratify foreign subsidiaries’ initiatives, and hence to 
deter and prevent managers in foreign subsidiaries from engaging in bribery. Conversely, 
firms without having external auditing tend to have less accountable financial information 
and less transparent decision making process, which in turn exacerbates information 
asymmetric and strengthen the link between foreign ownership and bribery supply. Thus, we 
hypothesize:  
Hypothesis 3. A firm’s adoption of external auditing negatively moderates the 
relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. 
 
External auditor’s influence on the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery 
may depend on upon the institutional environment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
there is an “agency cost” involved in making the agent work in the principals’ interests 
instead of their own. Monitoring expenditure is one important element of agency costs. The 
fact that large audit fees and consulting fees received by auditors is a well-known norm 
(Ascioglu, Hegde, & McDermott, 2005; Frankel, Johnson, & Nelson, 2002). 
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Bribery is hard to detect in practice. Luo and Han (2009) for example address the various 
forms of illegal payments to public officials, such as cash and gifts. Moreover, given that 
there are important cultural differences in how bribery is viewed, it is not always clear if one 
activity is bribery or not. For example, gift giving is a prevalent social custom in China in all 
areas of life. However, the borderline between gifts and bribery is often blurred (Steidlmeier, 
1999). Thus, monitoring the management in the foreign subsidiaries is a significant cost as 
the headquarter has to develop a clear standard to verify the difference between social 
reciprocity and bribery.  
We posit that multinational firms have the desire of controlling bribery level to reduce 
nonmarket-based costs. Weak formal institutions, however, make foreign subsidiaries less 
likely to disclose information about operation and transactions and raise the possibility for 
foreign subsidiaries to bribe government officials in the host country. External auditing, 
therefore, becomes vital because it is the only means to mitigate agency problem and ensure 
an ethical conduct of foreign subsidiaries. In contrast, the multinational firm may become a 
free-rider when well-developed formal institutions bear the costs of monitoring alone, 
whereas all foreign investors benefit from the monitoring efforts. Therefore, we propose: 
Hypothesis 4. The weaker the formal institutions in the host country, the more important 
role a firm’s adoption of external auditing would play in moderating the relationship between 
foreign ownership and bribery intensity. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1 Sample and data 
15 
We acquire the dataset from the World Enterprise Surveys (WES) to test our hypotheses. 
The survey was carried out in 139 countries with over 100,000 firms participating between 
2006 and 2014. Some countries are surveyed every three to four years. Due to the nature of 
the survey, our sample is a cross-sectional dataset. The Enterprise Survey covers a wide range 
of topics about the business environment as well as detailed performance measures for each 
firm. The use of this unique dataset has three important advantages. First, the World Bank 
carefully follows a stratified random-sampling procedure for selecting samples to ensure the 
representation of sample firms in each country. Firms in the survey present a rich structure 
coverage in terms of size, ownership, industry, location, business plans, and market 
orientations1. Second, the respondents of the survey are senior business executives or 
entrepreneurs in each country and WES set up careful criteria to ensure the validity and 
reliability of responses. Third, the validity of components of the bribery items and the 
credibility of using WES data for bribery research have been confirmed by substantial studies 
(Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). This is the best available source of data on the studies of this topic 
(Birhanu et al., 2016). 
To test our hypotheses on country-level factors, we merge the dataset with the business 
freedom index from the Heritage Foundation and country development index from World 
Development Indicators Database from the World Bank. It has been widely acknowledged 
that there are noticeable missing data for some countries in WES dataset (Goedhuys & 
Sleuwaegen, 2016; Luo & Han, 2009). But missing observations across bribery analyses are 
not likely related to any systematic pattern (Birhanu et al., 2016). We have followed the 
                                                          
1 For more details on questionnaire and methodology, see: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology.    
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normal practice to carefully remove observations with missing values for our main variables 
of interest (Goedhuys & Sleuwaegen, 2016), and have a sample consisted of 38,673 firms 
from 18 sectors, across 113 countries. There might be a concern about the missing data for 
our whole sample. To control for this limitation, we have applied robustness checks on 
non-response biases and sample selection biases (i.e. t-test, Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, 
Heckman test and Hausman test). There is no evidence suggesting that missing observations 
and sample selection bias might be the concern in our study, which is consistent with the 
previous studies using the WES dataset (Lee & Weng, 2013; Svensson, 2003). Table 1 
presents a brief summary of our sample distribution. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
3.2 Measurement 
Dependent Variable. Following previous studies (Lee & Weng, 2013; Luo & Han, 2009), 
our dependent variable “bribery intensity” is defined as the percentage of total annual sales 
paid as informal payments to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, 
regulations, services, etc.  
Independent Variable. Following previous research (Lee, Oh, & Eden, 2010), foreign 
ownership is measured by the percentage of the total share owned by foreign individuals, 
companies or organizations.  
Moderators. Our first moderator, business freedom, is measured by the logarithm of the 
business freedom index from Heritage Foundation. Business freedom is an overall indicator 
of the efficiency of government regulation of business, which has been used in international 
business studies to measure formal institutions (Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009). The 
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quantitative score is derived from an array of measurements of the difficulty of starting, 
operating, and closing a business. The business freedom score ranges between 0 and 100, in 
which a higher score indicates a more free business environment. The score is based on 
factors including measuring the procedures and costs to starting a business, obtaining a 
license, and closing a business.  
Our second moderator, external auditing, is a binary variable, which equals to 1 if the 
firm had its annual financial statement checked and certified by an external auditor and 0 
otherwise. Consistent with previous studies (Wu, 2009; Zhou, Han, & Wang, 2013), external 
auditing is a good indicator to corporate governance and plays an important role in 
controlling bribery. 
Control Variables. We follow previous studies to control for a comprehensive set of 
firm-level and country-level determinants of bribery. We include firm size as a continuous 
variable measured by the logarithm of the total employees of the firm (Blasi, Conte, & Kruse, 
1996). Firm age is the logarithm of the number of years the firm has established (Lee & 
Weng, 2013). Manager’s experience in working in the industry she/he is currently employed 
is also considered (Birhanu et al., 2016). Export orientation is proxied by the percentage of 
export sales to total sales (Lee et al., 2010). In addition, we include government contract, a 
dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm has attempted to secure a government contract 
(Ufere, Perelli, Boland, & Carlsson, 2012). Public listing is a dummy variable that equals 1 if 
the firm is publicly listed, and 0 otherwise. Product quality is measured by whether the firm 
received ISO (e.g., 9000, 9002 or 14,000) certification, which a dummy variable that equals 1 
if yes and 0 otherwise. Ownership concentration is measured by the percentage of the share 
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owned by the largest shareholder, which captures the influence and existence of a block 
holder (Lee & O'Neill, 2003). Regarding the country level controls, GDP growth (annual 
growth rate) and FDI inflows (measured as the percentage of FDI inflows to GDP) are also 
controlled (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). Finally, we use a group of dummy variables to control 
for industry, region, and year effects. Table 2 presents the summary of our variables 
definitions.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
4. Results 
4.1 Empirical results 
Table 3 lists the means, standard deviations, and correlations of our variables. In the 
sample, firms are found to pay on average 1.6% of their sales in bribery, and 5.91 % of firms 
in the sample is controlled by foreign investors. Further, we calculate the variance inflation 
factor (VIF), and the value ranges from 1.01 to 1.44, which is below the critical value of 10 
(Neter, Wasserman, & Kutner, 1985) and reduces the concern of multicollinearity.  
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
We apply a Tobit model in the context of censored dependent variables and deal with the 
possible threat of heteroscedasticity by the Huber-White correction (White, 1980). The use of 
Tobit models is based on the nature of the dependent variable. In our sample about 77% of 
the firms have zero bribery payment. The dependent variable is left censored at zero (Weigelt 
& Miller, 2013; Wu, Pangarkar, & Wu, 2016), nonnegative (Alexeev & Song, 2013; Fu, Hou, 
& Sanfilippo, 2016), and has non-normal distribution (Bertrand & Mol, 2013), so the 
appropriate estimation technique is Tobit rather than OLS. This is consistent with previous 
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bribery research using this dataset (Breen, Gillanders, McNulty, & Suzuki, 2016; Khalil, 
Saffar, & Trabelsi, 2015). In addition, we follow previous research to mean-center variables 
in the interaction terms to avoid problems of multicollinearity and to increase the 
interpretability of interactions (Aiken, West, & Reno, 1991). To test the predictions of 
different levels of business freedom, we divide the full sample into two groups. If the 
business freedom in the country is lower than the median value, it is categorized as the “low” 
group and the “high” group otherwise. We run Tobit regressions on the full sample and two 
subsamples to test our hypotheses. Table 4 shows the results of the Tobit analyses. Model 1 
in Table 4 includes control variables only. Model 2 adds the main explanatory variable, 
foreign ownership, as well as our moderators, business freedom, and external auditing. 
Models 3 and 4 add an interaction term sequentially. 
[Insert Tables 4 about here] 
Model 2 in Table 4 tests our Hypothesis 1, which predicts that there is a positive 
relationship between a firm’s foreign ownership and bribery intensity. The coefficients are all 
positive and significant in each model (p<0.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 1 is supported. Model 
3 in Table 4 test the moderating effect of formal institutions– business freedom – on the 
relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. Regarding the direct effect, we 
can find that business freedom negatively influences bribery intensity significantly. 
Regarding the moderating effect, the result of the interaction term between business freedom 
and foreign ownership is significantly negative (p<0.01), which supports Hypothesis 2, i.e.  
formal institutions negatively moderate the relationship between foreign ownership and 
bribery intensity. Model 4 in Table 4 tests the moderating effect of external auditing on the 
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relationship between foreign ownership and bribery. Regarding the direct, we can find that 
external auditing has a negative and significant impact on bribery intensity. Regarding the 
moderating effect, the interaction term between external auditing and foreign ownership is 
insignificant. Thus, Hypothesis 3 is not supported. Since the role of external auditing is not 
significant in the full sample, we further explore the moderating effects of external auditing 
on foreign ownership and bribery intensity in countries with different levels of business 
freedom.  
Models 5-6 in Table 4 tests our Hypothesis 4, which posits that the weaker the formal 
institutions in the host country, the more important role the external auditing would play in 
moderating the relationship between foreign ownership and bribery intensity. As shown in 
Model 5 in Table 4, the interaction term between external auditing and foreign ownership is 
insignificant in the high business freedom group, which implies that external auditing plays 
no role in controlling bribery of FOEs in the country with stronger formal institutions. 
However, the interaction term between external auditing and foreign ownership in Model 6 is 
significantly negative (p<0.01) in the low business freedom group, which indicates that the 
external auditing plays an important role in controlling bribery of FOEs in the country with 
weaker formal institutions. Therefore, Hypothesis 4 is supported.  
Regarding control variables, we find that the firm size, firm age, GDP growth and FDI 
inflows are negatively related to bribery intensity in the full sample. Export orientation, 
engaging in the government contract, and ownership concentration have positive impacts on 
bribery behavior. Manager’s experience, public listing, and product quality are not 
significantly related to bribery behavior.  
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4.2 Robust analyses  
We run several robustness checks to ensure the robustness of our results to alternative 
measures and methods. First, there might be concerns about noticeable missing data and 
potential sample selection biases. To address the issue, we run two-step Heckman test to 
check the robustness of our results. The first step is to run Probit regression on a firm’s 
response to the bribery question. The dependent variable takes the value 1 if the firm 
responded to bribery questions, and 0 otherwise. Following the previous studies using 
Heckman model, we remain all the independent variables in our main model and add two 
instrument variables (corruption perception index and the log of GNI per capita) that are 
found to affect the response to bribery questions (Jensen, Li, & Rahman, 2010). The second 
step is to add inverse mills ratio from the first stage regression to the second stage Tobit 
regression (i.e. our main model). The results show that the coefficient of inverse mills ratio is 
not significant in all model specifications, which indicates that sample selection bias should 
not be the concern in our study. Furthermore, we conduct Hausman test to check if the results 
from two models including and excluding inverse mills ratio are fundamentally different. The 
results cannot reject the null hypothesis, indicating that the difference in coefficients is not 
systematic. Therefore, our results are robust to the issues of missing observations and 
possible sample selection biases. 
Second, we use different measures of our main independent variable to check the 
robustness of our results. While any shareholding by a shareholder may indicate different 
interference and interest in the firm, scholars have used different cutoffs of foreign 
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shareholding in firms when assigning FOE status (Demirbag, Glaister, & Tatoglu, 2007; 
Desender, Aguilera, Lópezpuertas-Lamy, & Crespi, 2016). To address the control power of 
foreign ownership, we consider dummy variables with cutoff at 50% as alternative measure 
of foreign ownership. The results in Table 5 are consistent with those results reported in 
Table 4. The results for dummy variables with cutoff at 30% and 5% as alternative measures 
of foreign ownership are also consistent. 
Third, we check if our results are robust to different model specifications. We run OLS 
regression as the baseline results although it might not be appropriate in the context of 
censored dependent variables. We report the results in Table 6 and find that the results are 
qualitatively consistent with those in Table 4. In addition, we conduct Probit analyses with 
bivariate dependent variable (i.e. bribery propensity yes/no) as an alternative model 
specification. The results in Table 7 are consistent with those presented in Table 4.  
Finally, it has been argued that the interaction effect in nonlinear models may not be 
simply judged by its coefficient (Ai & Norton, 2003). Following the previous studies 
(Holburn & Bergh, 2014; Mishra, 2017; Wiersema & Bowen, 2008), we examine the 
marginal effect of the interaction terms in Table 8. The marginal effects of foreign ownership 
are positive and significant (p<0.01), consistent with our results in Table 4. We can find that 
the marginal effect of foreign ownership is decreasing as the level of business freedom 
increase in the full sample and that the marginal effect of foreign ownership is decreasing 
when external auditing exists in the low business freedom subgroup. To better demonstrate 
the marginal effects on interaction terms, we plot the graph of predicted bribery intensity to 
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show the interaction effects in Fig.1 and 2. We can see the existence of moderating effects (at 
the 95% confidence interval) as indicated in H2 and H4.  
[Insert Tables 5-8 about here] 
[Insert Figures 1-2 about here] 
5. Discussion 
In this study, we distinguished two corruption (i.e. bribery supply) control mechanisms 
and explained the interplay between external auditing and formal institutions in controlling 
bribery associated with foreign ownership. Our analysis of 38,673 enterprises across 113 
countries supported our hypotheses and demonstrated foreign ownership exacerbates bribery. 
Such result challenges previous corruption literature in the international business field. 
Previous studies adopt resource dependence theory and imply that the crux of bribery is 
firm’s dependency of external resources in the host country (Luo & Han, 2009). The 
important role that bribery plays is a mechanism for complementing resource dependencies 
and a vehicle for co-opting important external actors, especially local government officials. 
However, resource dependency theory in explaining corruption has viewed foreign investors 
as an aggregate construct and overemphasized its relationship with the other public actors. 
Pervious research becomes even more problematic when we take multinational firms into 
consideration. We argue that there is an agency problem between multinational firm’s 
headquarter and its foreign subsidiaries and propose foreign subsidiaries are assigned the role 
of being the agents of headquarters. Hence our findings reflect resource dependency theory’s 
inability to identify the diversity of attributes towards bribery within the multinational firm. 
In specific, we suggest that foreign subsidiaries act as self-interested agent and may engage in 
bribery that is inconsistent with headquarters’ ethics. Our findings acknowledge the 
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differences between multinational firm’s headquarter and its foreign subsidiaries and imply 
that identities of the headquarter and foreign subsidiaries have important implications 
because they may have different objectives and decision-making horizons. Our finding thus 
contributes to the agency theory literature by explicitly placing the agency relationship under 
circumstances where the principal and the agent have different attitudes and interests in 
supplying bribery in the host market. 
Furthermore, our study analyzes how institutional context affects the agency problem 
between a multinational firm’s headquarter and its foreign subsidiaries regarding bribery 
intensity. In particular, our study demonstrates that formal aspect of the institutions (i.e. 
market freedom) affects such agency relationship. Critiques of agency theory point out its 
“under-contextualised” nature (Aguilera & Jackson, 2003) and hence its inability to identify 
and explain the diversity of principal and agent’s activities across different institutional 
settings. By integrating the institutional theory with agency theory, the study provides an 
opportunity to examine bribery intensity under varied formal institutional settings. In settings 
with developed formal institutions, foreign subsidiaries tend to engage less in bribery because 
government regulations discipline a firm’s behavior and compel information disclosure. 
However, in settings where there are weak formal institutions and information asymmetry is 
severe, foreign subsidiaries are more likely to act as self-interest opportunists and bribe the 
local government officials and other public agents.   
Our empirical results also demonstrate the substitute effects between formal institution as 
a macro-level governance mechanism and external auditing as a micro-level governance 
mechanism. In specific, we found that in settings with weak formal institutions, a 
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multinational firm adopts external auditing as a mechanism to monitor subsidiaries’ operation 
to eliminating bribery more effectively. By contrast, in settings with well-developed formal 
institutions, a multinational firm’s headquarter can rely on the macro-level governance 
mechanism to discern subsidiaries’ bribery-related conducts. Our findings indicate that the 
host country’s institutional setting signals ethical foreign investors to strengthen internal 
governance under an environment where external governance is weak. 
Our finding has important implications for foreign investors, particularly with respect to 
a multinational firm’s managers who seek to control bribery in the host countries. First, 
awareness of foreign subsidiaries’ attitudes towards corruptions is pre-condition to develop 
ethical conducts. Effective communication and monitoring processes are viable mechanisms 
to counterbalance the managerial opportunism. Second, a firm’s engaging in bribery is found 
to be contingent on its external formal institutional settings, foreign investors can then 
monitor the managerial behavior in different manners and strengths according to the 
developmental level of the formal institutions of the host countries. 
This paper has three limitations, which requires further studies in the future. First, our 
sample concentrates on the monetary feature of bribery. Bribery, nevertheless, can be offered 
in many other different forms, such as personal favor, gifts, etc. Further research can develop 
an alternative and more comprehensive measure for bribery to better capture the nature of this 
unethical behavior. Second, our study has discussed governance of the firm-level bribery 
from the supply perspective. Since government officials may be demanding bribery in many 
occasions, further research should concentrate on exploring possible governance mechanisms 
to control bribery demands. Third, it is important to understand the roles of different types of 
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foreign investors are playing in bribery control across institutional settings. For example, 
strategic foreign investors and foreign institutional investors may have different attributes 
towards corruption and different means of controlling bribery in foreign subsidiaries. In the 
future, researchers should endeavor to solve this puzzle using field research methods. 
 
6. Conclusion 
In this paper we go beyond the traditional view of agency theory and stress the agency 
relationship between managers at headquarter and managers in the foreign subsidiaries in a 
multinational enterprise. We address bribery, as a consequence of such agency relationship 
and articulate the substitute effects of macro-institutions and micro-level governance 
mechanism in controlling bribery under international business context. Future studies can 
extend our research in two ways. First, the institutional theory is a stimulating theoretical lens 
for extending our understanding of bribery supply. The underdeveloped formal institutions in 
emerging economies may pressure foreign investor to comply with local unwritten rules to 
gain legitimacy. Second, the agency theory can be extended in international business context 
by differentiating the actors within the agency relationship in more detail. In specific, how 
different types of foreign investors and managers in the foreign subsidiaries (i.e. local hired 
manager and expatriate managers) affect bribery control at the firm level is underexplored. 
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Table 1 Sample Distribution 
Panel A: Sample distribution by country 
Country Obs. Percent  Country Obs. Percent  Country Obs. Percent  Country Obs. Percent 
Albania 126 0.33  Cote d'Ivoire 108 0.28  Lithuania 9 0.02  Sierra Leone 20 0.05 
Angola 504 1.3  DRC 239 0.62  Madagascar 64 0.17  Slovak Republic 17 0.04 
Argentina 1,290 3.34  Dominica 148 0.38  Malawi 79 0.2  Slovenia 5 0.01 
Armenia 33 0.09  Dominican Republic 305 0.79  Mali 580 1.5  South Africa 877 2.27 
Azerbaijan 16 0.04  Ecuador 684 1.77  Mauritania 192 0.5  Sri Lanka 518 1.34 
Bangladesh 506 1.31  Elsalvador 298 0.77  Mauritius 7 0.02  St Lucia 145 0.37 
Barbados 119 0.31  Eritrea 158 0.41  Mexico 946 2.45  St Vincent and Grenadines 139 0.36 
Belarus 13 0.03  Estonia 1 0  Micronesia 7 0.02  Suriname 143 0.37 
Belize 137 0.35  Ethiopia 454 1.17  Moldova 39 0.1  Swaziland 283 0.73 
Benin 64 0.17  Fiji 128 0.33  Mongolia 33 0.09  Tajikistan 89 0.23 
Bhutan 216 0.56  Fyr Macedonia 27 0.07  Montenegro 8 0.02  Tanzania 363 0.94 
Bolivia 605 1.56  Gabon 11 0.03  Mozambique 369 0.95  Timor Leste 93 0.24 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 18 0.05  Georgia 4 0.01  Namibia 529 1.37  Togo 74 0.19 
Botswana 486 1.26  Ghana 455 1.18  Nepal 296 0.77  Tonga 76 0.2 
Brazil 130 0.34  Guatemala 735 1.9  Nicaragua 478 1.24  Trinidad and Tobago 252 0.65 
Bulgaria 721 1.86  Guinea 175 0.45  Niger 69 0.18  Turkey 422 1.09 
Burkina Faso 190 0.49  Guinea Bissau 98 0.25  Nigeria 2,180 5.64  Uganda 431 1.11 
Burundi 240 0.62  Guyana 140 0.36  Pakistan 250 0.65  Ukraine 104 0.27 
Cameroon 259 0.67  Honduras 484 1.25  Panama 519 1.34  Uruguay 594 1.54 
Cape Verde 82 0.21  Hungary 11 0.03  Paraguay 382 0.99  Uzbekistan 147 0.38 
Central African republic 89 0.23  Indonesia 1,072 2.77  Peru 1,231 3.18  Vanuatu 13 0.03 
Chad 94 0.24  Jamaica 233 0.6  Philippines 883 2.28  Venezuela 158 0.41 
Chile 1,691 4.37  Kazakhstan 74 0.19  Poland 16 0.04  Vietnam 548 1.42 
China 1,714 4.43  Kenya 645 1.67  Romania 28 0.07  Yemen 318 0.82 
Colombia 1,509 3.9  Kyrgyz Republic 56 0.14  Russia 3,292 8.51  Zambia 445 1.15 
Congo 11 0.03  Lao PDR 367 0.95  Rwanda 357 0.92  Zimbabwe 468 1.21 
Costa Rica 34 0.09  Latvia 12 0.03  Samoa 56 0.14     
Croatia 452 1.17  Lesotho 10 0.03  Senegal 463 1.2     
Czech Republic 13 0.03  Liberia 28 0.07  Serbia 47 0.12     
Panel B: Sample distribution by year 
Year Obs. Percent   Obs. Percent  Year Obs. Percent  Year Obs. Percent 
2006 8,845 22.87  2008 779 2.01  2010 8,759 22.65  2012 4,984 12.89 
2007 7,892 20.41  2009 5,712 14.77  2011 1,702 4.4     
Panel C: Sample distribution by industry 
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Industry Obs. Percent  Industry Obs. Percent  Industry Obs. Percent  Industry Obs. Percent 
Basic Metals 633 1.64  Food 3,819 9.88  Non-Metallic Mineral Products 750 1.94  Transport 156 0.4 
Chemicals 1,630 4.21  Garments 2,280 5.9  Other Manufacturing 10,326 26.7  Whole retail 7,046 18.22 
Construction 399 1.03  Hotels & Restaurants 225 0.58  Other services 7,448 19.26     
Electronics 424 1.1  IT 638 1.65  Rubber & Plastics Products 306 0.79     
Fabricated metal products 493 1.27  Machinery & Equipment 539 1.39  Textiles 1,561 4.04     
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Table 2 Variable definitions 
Variables  Definitions 
Dependent variable  
Bribery intensity The percentage of total annual sales paid as informal payments to “get things done” with regard to customs, taxes, licenses, regulations, services, etc.  
Independent variables  
Foreign ownership The percentage of the total share owned by foreign individuals, companies or organizations. 
Business freedom The logarithm of the business freedom index from Heritage Foundation 
External auditing 1 for the firm having its annual financial statement checked and certified by an external auditor, and 0 otherwise. 
Control variables  
Firm size The logarithm of firm total employees 
Firm age The logarithm of the number of years the firm has established 
Manager’s experience  The logarithm of the number of years that the top manager worked in the sector in which s/he is working. 
Export orientation The percentage of export sales to total sales 
Government contract 1 for the firm having secured or attempted to secure a government contract, and 0 otherwise. 
Public listing 1 for the firm being publicly listed, and 0 otherwise. 
Product quality 1 for the firm having received ISO, and 0 otherwise.  
Ownership concentration The percentage of share the largest shareholder own 
GDP growth The annual growth rate of GDP in the country 
FDI inflow The percentage of FDI inflows to GDP 
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Table 3 Summary statistics and correlation matrix 
 
Mean St. Dev 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 
1. Bribery intensity 0.0163 0.0559 
            
 
2. Foreign ownership 0.0591 0.2359 0.0272 
           
 
3. Business freedom 4.0724 0.2298 -0.0702 0.0928 
          
 
4. External auditing 0.4776 0.4995 -0.0378 0.1338 0.0862 
         
 
5. Firm size 3.2293 1.2887 -0.0626 0.1525 0.0940 0.3418 
        
 
6. Firm age 2.6731 0.9200 -0.0434 0.0209 0.0432 0.1750 0.2828 
       
 
7. Manager’s experience  2.6727 0.6990 -0.0336 -0.0228 0.1077 0.1002 0.1794 0.3915 
      
 
8. Export orientation 0.0793 0.2234 -0.0102 0.1310 0.0677 0.1162 0.2690 0.0534 0.0685 
     
 
9. Government contract 0.0937 0.7098 0.0114 0.0040 0.0201 0.0365 0.0474 0.0043 0.0434 -0.0058 
    
 
10. Public listing 0.0405 0.1972 -0.0070 0.0452 0.0318 0.0850 0.1687 0.0770 0.0190 0.0384 0.0082 
   
 
11. Product quality 0.1946 0.3959 -0.0270 0.1437 0.0336 0.2375 0.3842 0.1417 0.0889 0.1816 0.0121 0.1014 
  
 
12. Ownership concentration 0.6060 0.3853 0.0449 0.0240 0.0816 -0.0956 -0.0587 -0.0970 -0.0637 -0.0236 -0.0041 0.0042 -0.0481   
13. GDP growth 5.1990 3.9147 -0.0458 0.0202 -0.2708 0.0420 0.0039 -0.0059 -0.0228 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0175 0.0106 0.0073  
14. FDI inflow 4.2986 3.6196 -0.0394 0.0598 0.2007 0.0235 0.0217 0.0149 0.0770 0.0660 0.0163 0.0138 0.0447 0.0745 0.0947 
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Table 4 Tobit analysis of foreign ownership and bribery  
Dependent variable Bribery intensity  
Estimation method Tobit 
Measure of foreign ownership Continuous variable 
Level of business freedom   High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variable       
Foreign ownership  0.0436*** 1.3758*** 0.0528*** -0.0079 0.1831*** 
  (0.0047) (0.0907) (0.0079) (0.0131) (0.0110) 
Moderators       
Business freedom  -0.0730*** -0.0514*** -0.0728***   
  (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)   
External auditing  -0.0108*** -0.0104*** -0.0101*** 0.0161*** -0.0222*** 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0038) (0.0031) 
Interactions       
Foreign ownership×Business freedom   -0.3258***    
   (0.0221)    
Foreign ownership×External auditing    -0.0132 -0.0004 -0.0473*** 
    (0.0094) (0.0154) (0.0130) 
Control Variables       
Firm size -0.0026*** -0.0018* -0.0017* -0.0018* -0.0090*** -0.0050*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013) 
Firm age -0.0056*** -0.0061*** -0.0056*** -0.0060*** -0.0089*** -0.0079*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Manager’s experience 0.0012 0.0015 0.0008 0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0108*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
Export orientation 0.0172*** 0.0128** 0.0131** 0.0128** 0.0050 0.0216*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0061) 
Government contract 0.0124*** 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 0.0133*** 0.0159*** 0.0099*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0031) 
Public listing 0.0067 0.0075 0.0080 0.0075 0.0155** 0.0102 
 (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Product quality -0.0041 -0.0042 -0.0037 -0.0041 -0.0015 -0.0148*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0040) 
Ownership concentration 0.0284*** 0.0263*** 0.0249*** 0.0265*** 0.0392*** 0.0547*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0037) 
GDP growth -0.0003 -0.0012*** -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0061*** -0.0035*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
FDI inflow -0.0040*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0031*** -0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.1719*** 0.1379*** 0.0499** 0.1369*** -0.0945*** -0.0396*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0093) (0.0080) 
Year/industry/region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 38673 38673 38673 38673 17892 20781 
Log likelihood / R2 -5570.7237 -5432.7345 -5298.4502 -5431.8391 -3158.1560 -3315.9015 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 5 Robust analysis: foreign ownership as dummy variable  
Dependent variable Bribery intensity  
Estimation method Tobit 
Measure of foreign ownership Dummy variable (cutoff at 50%) 
Level of business freedom   High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variable       
Foreign ownership  0.0370*** 1.1724*** 0.0402*** -0.0133 0.1560*** 
  (0.0043) (0.0781) (0.0072) (0.0125) (0.0095) 
Moderators       
Business freedom  -0.0723*** -0.0530*** -0.0723***   
  (0.0056) (0.0056) (0.0056)   
External auditing  -0.0106*** -0.0103*** -0.0104*** 0.0158*** -0.0222*** 
  (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0024) (0.0037) (0.0032) 
Interactions       
Foreign ownership×Business freedom   -0.2778***    
   (0.0191)    
Foreign ownership×External auditing    -0.0046 0.0059 -0.0355*** 
    (0.0086) (0.0145) (0.0114) 
Control Variables       
Firm size -0.0026*** -0.0017 -0.0016 -0.0017 -0.0090*** -0.0048*** 
 (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0010) (0.0016) (0.0013) 
Firm age -0.0056*** -0.0061*** -0.0056*** -0.0061*** -0.0089*** -0.0081*** 
 (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0014) (0.0021) (0.0019) 
Manager’s experience 0.0012 0.0015 0.0009 0.0015 -0.0027 -0.0109*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0017) (0.0026) (0.0023) 
Export orientation 0.0172*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0135*** 0.0051 0.0230*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0051) (0.0052) (0.0051) (0.0086) (0.0062) 
Government contract 0.0124*** 0.0133*** 0.0134*** 0.0133*** 0.0158*** 0.0101*** 
 (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0028) (0.0029) (0.0045) (0.0031) 
Public listing 0.0067 0.0077 0.0081 0.0077 0.0154** 0.0106 
 (0.0054) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0053) (0.0077) (0.0075) 
Product quality -0.0041 -0.0039 -0.0036 -0.0039 -0.0015 -0.0146*** 
 (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0031) (0.0047) (0.0040) 
Ownership concentration 0.0284*** 0.0265*** 0.0254*** 0.0266*** 0.0391*** 0.0551*** 
 (0.0034) (0.0034) (0.0033) (0.0034) (0.0050) (0.0037) 
GDP growth -0.0003 -0.0012*** -0.0010*** -0.0012*** -0.0061*** -0.0035*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0005) (0.0004) 
FDI inflow -0.0040*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0034*** -0.0031*** -0.0002 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0006) 
Constant -0.1719*** 0.1346*** 0.0558** 0.1343*** -0.0942*** -0.0397*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0243) (0.0244) (0.0243) (0.0093) (0.0081) 
Year/industry/region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 38673 38673 38673 38673 17892 20781 
Log likelihood  -5570.7237 -5439.3296 -5322.7491 -5439.2019 -3157.8185 -3344.1118 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
41 
Table 6 Robust analysis: OLS regression  
Dependent variable Bribery intensity  
Estimation method OLS 
Measure of foreign ownership Continuous variable 
Level of business freedom   High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variable       
Foreign ownership  0.0094*** 0.4034*** 0.0148*** -0.0023 0.0690*** 
  (0.0016) (0.0445) (0.0034) (0.0018) (0.0089) 
Moderators       
Business freedom  -0.0180*** -0.0134*** -0.0207***   
  (0.0016) (0.0015) (0.0015)   
External auditing  -0.0012** -0.0012** -0.0014** 0.0006 -0.0016* 
  (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0010) 
Interactions       
Foreign ownership×Business freedom   -0.0949***    
   (0.0105)    
Foreign ownership×External auditing    -0.0061 0.0032 -0.0345*** 
    (0.0037) (0.0024) (0.0100) 
Control Variables       
Firm size -0.0015*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0029*** 
 (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0004) 
Firm age -0.0006* -0.0009** -0.0007** -0.0009** -0.0011*** -0.0008 
 (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0006) 
Manager’s experience 0.0000 0.0001 -0.0000 0.0004 0.0012** -0.0024*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0008) 
Export orientation 0.0024 0.0016 0.0017 0.0020 0.0005 0.0013 
 (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0015) (0.0017) (0.0022) 
Government contract 0.0012** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0013*** 0.0018*** 0.0011 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0013) (0.0004) (0.0008) 
Public listing 0.0005 0.0004 0.0005 0.0001 0.0013 0.0025 
 (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.008) (0.0015) (0.0023) 
Product quality 0.0014* 0.0011 0.0012 0.0013 0.0003 -0.0010 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) 
Ownership concentration 0.0032*** 0.0028*** 0.0025*** 0.0013 0.0028*** 0.0086*** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0011) 
GDP growth 0.0002* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0011*** -0.0008*** 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) (0.0001) 
FDI inflow -0.0005*** -0.0003*** -0.0003** -0.0002* -0.0002*** -0.0002 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0002) 
Constant 0.0132*** 0.0896*** 0.0709*** 0.1154*** 0.0200*** 0.0379*** 
 (0.0021) (0.0071) (0.0069) (0.0070) (0.0017) (0.0029) 
Year/industry/region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 38673 38673 38673 38673 17892 20781 
R2 0.039 0.044 0.049 0.042 0.015 0.026 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 7 Robust analysis: Probit models  
Dependent variable Bribery propensity  
Estimation method probit  
Measure of foreign ownership Continuous variable 
Level of business freedom   High Low 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Independent Variable       
Foreign ownership  0.3468*** 35.8824*** 0.4640*** -0.0223 2.5420*** 
  (0.0330) (2.3138) (0.0587) (0.0905) (0.2494) 
Moderators       
Business freedom  -0.5504*** -0.3235*** -0.7294***   
  (0.0413) (0.0416) (0.0378)   
External auditing  -0.1055*** -0.1118*** -0.0914*** 0.1468*** -0.2196*** 
  (0.0171) (0.0174) (0.0171) (0.0254) (0.0216) 
Interactions       
Foreign ownership×Business freedom   -8.5352***    
   (0.5569)    
Foreign ownership×External auditing    -0.1063 -0.0697 -1.3220*** 
    (0.0689) (0.1039) (0.2592) 
Control Variables       
Firm size 0.0117* 0.0201*** 0.0166** 0.0071*** -0.0474*** -0.0037 
 (0.0071) (0.0074) (0.0075) (0.0038) (0.0105) (0.0094) 
Firm age -0.0482*** -0.0527*** -0.0468*** -0.0497*** -0.0600*** -0.0789*** 
 (0.0096) (0.0098) (0.0099) (0.0093) (0.0141) (0.0126) 
Manager’s experience 0.0057 0.0098 0.0015 0.0119 -0.0495*** -0.0860*** 
 (0.0122) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0121) (0.0176) (0.0154) 
Export orientation 0.1298*** 0.0983*** 0.0950*** 0.1405*** 0.0358 0.2057*** 
 (0.0354) (0.0356) (0.0367) (0.0348) (0.0539) (0.0462) 
Government contract 0.1008*** 0.1097*** 0.1155*** 0.1044*** 0.0997*** 0.0960*** 
 (0.0189) (0.0198) (0.0207) (0.0196) (0.0283) (0.0222) 
Public listing 0.0645* 0.0712* 0.0785** 0.0990** 0.1116** 0.0618 
 (0.0387) (0.0387) (0.0397) (0.0383) (0.0526) (0.0561) 
Product quality -0.0543** -0.0530** -0.0456** -0.0873*** -0.0153 -0.1418*** 
 (0.0221) (0.0224) (0.0229) (0.0217) (0.0319) (0.0285) 
Ownership concentration 0.2640*** 0.2489*** 0.2323*** 0.2504*** 0.3000*** 0.4586*** 
 (0.0240) (0.0241) (0.0245) (0.0241) (0.0325) (0.0239) 
GDP growth -0.0060** -0.0132*** -0.0115*** -0.0131*** -0.0440*** -0.0314*** 
 (0.0025) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0026) (0.0030) (0.0030) 
FDI inflow -0.0366*** -0.0318*** -0.0315*** -0.0318*** -0.0265*** 0.0011 
 (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0039) (0.0039) 
Constant -1.2603*** 1.0937*** 0.1724 1.0873*** -0.5257*** -0.1928*** 
 (0.0657) (0.1897) (0.1919) (0.1898) (0.0576) (0.0534) 
Year/industry/region effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
N 38673 38673 38673 38673 17892 20781 
Log likelihood -17959.7190 -17803.6010 -17404.8490 -17634.432 -7595.2103 -11466.9050 
Standard errors in parentheses * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
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Table 8 The analyses of the marginal effect of foreign ownership conditional upon the value of moderators 
Sample Moderator variable Level of moderator1 Total marginal effects2 
Full sample Business freedom 
Low 0.1375*** 
Mean 0.0561*** 
High 0.0398*** 
Low business 
freedom sample 
External auditing 
0 0.1831*** 
1 0.1358*** 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
1. For business freedom, its low (high) value is its value one standard deviation below (above) its mean. 
2. The total marginal effect is calculated as the effect of a one unit increase in foreign ownership on firm bribery intensity 
at the given value of moderator variable. 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Graphic presentations of the interaction effect between business freedom and foreign ownership in the full sample 
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Figure 2 Graphic presentations of the interaction effect between external auditing on bribery intensity in the subsample 
                 
